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1.   Introduction
The UK Government’s policy on economic and social renewal, the ultimate goal of
which is to improve living standards for all, emphasises the importance of adopting a
partnership model of industrial relations.1 Government perceives this model of
employment relations as essential to achieving continued competitiveness in a
globalised economy, especially where productivity, however measured, does not
match that of other major industrialised countries.2 Narrowing the gap in
competitiveness is thought to require businesses and individuals to acquire new skills
and knowledge essential to provide higher value-added goods and services.3
Although there are divergent conceptions of precisely what partnership might entail, at
its broadest level it would seem to require a cultural change that encourages greater
mutuality and respect for employees. This is offered in exchange for enhanced
motivation, 'flexibility' and innovation on the part of employees. Partnership might
thus address the manner in which employees are treated, their opportunity to
contribute to the workplace, and their commitment to the success of the enterprise.
 
    
2Within European Employment Strategy, the greatest prominence appears to be given
to the campaign for full employment. However, the true position is more complex
because, in annual Recommendations addressed to member states as "employment
guidelines", the Council of the European Union insists that there should be policies to
encourage the adaptability of businesses and their employees. As in the UK these
guidelines also emphasise the importance of partnerships to achieve the desired goals.
What seems to be envisaged here is a constructive engagement between capital and
labour at European, national, local, sectoral and enterprise levels.   But European
policy transcends social dialogue. The 2001 guidelines4 oblige member states to
introduce measures to ensure that the labour market adapts to structural change in the
economy.   The guidelines also advance a de-regulation agenda to promote enterprise.5
As in the United Kingdom, European policy makers are seeking a structural re-
invigoration of the economy and of the workplace. The problem is that, by adopting
the metaphor of partnership, policy makers are implying that the changes will be
mutually managed and of mutual benefit.  The guidelines reveal, however conflicting
agenda: de-regulation, flexibility and adaptability are not comfortably aligned with
ideas of mutual respect and dignity, each of which must be inherent in a partnership
approach. As we shall see below, similar tensions pervade policy making in the UK.
Thus a preliminary question arises as to what partnership actually means.
The purpose of the present article is to examine this question,  and to ask whether a
partnership agenda can effectively be realised without important and extensive
reforms in the legal regulation of the employment relationship.
32. Conceptions of Partnership
2.1 Background
The decline in collective industrial power and relatively high levels of unemployment
for much of the past two decades have enabled employers to make significantly
increased demands on employees in the pursuit of successful competition. This may
have a short term benefit in an increase in profits, but the tenor of the Fairness at
Work White Paper6 seemed to recognise that employees are cynically aware that
flexibility is too often a manipulative, one-sided, strategy designed to exploit their
economic weakness and dependence.   The loss of job security has eroded loyalty as
employees realise that the life span of a job will be for a period no longer than that in
which the individual offers up to date competencies from which the employer can
profit. Long hours have been associated with increased levels of illness, stress and
even premature death.7 Systematic ‘de-layering’ has removed otherwise predictable
career paths, in which some employees may have invested much of their working
lives.
A further trend has been the systematic transfer of economic risk to employees.
Predictable earnings have been replaced by contingency pay. This may be either profit
related or performance related, neither of which is advantageous for employees during
times of economic slowdown; either may cause resentment where pay is reduced for
causes outside the employees' control. Pay restraint applying to the majority of
employees, but not those at the 'top', encourages division that erodes the employees'
sense of having a stake in the success of the enterprise.  Insecure employees, with
4greater responsibilities and less opportunity for reward are unlikely to be fully
motivated to innovate, communicate new ideas or support the continuing struggle for
competitive advantage.8   
The effects of the globalised economy exert a major influence on the desired change
in the work-place culture. The removal or lowering of tariff barriers has meant that
domestic industry has been exposed to more competition from low cost overseas
producers. Rapidly developing technologies, ever higher consumer expectations, and a
general liberalisation in both trade and capital markets, have demanded that business
responds effectively to the re-structured commercial environment and the dynamic
upon which it insists.9    The wealth of the nation increasingly depends on the extent to
which it can attract inward investment as production may more easily be shifted
around the globe.10 Employment opportunities are less influenced by location alone
and rather more dependent upon an objective assessment of the potential profit that
may be won from maintaining or locating production in Britain. These decisions
embrace such matters as the availability of relevant skills, their relative cost, and the
productivity of the domestic workforce, as well as the efficiency of the transport
system and access to relevant product markets. Employment measures necessary to
attract internationally mobile investment are sometimes difficult to reconcile with a
genuinely compromising vision of the employment relationship. These and other
macro-economic policies can be disadvantageous to the interests of workers, thereby
tending to reduce their commitment to success. For example, the Government boasts
that the absence of social protection for UK workers is an asset to the UK economy.
Non-wage labour costs of UK workers are just 13% of total labour costs compared
with 15-30% of other G7 countries. Further, the UK has also one of the most lightly
5taxed economies in the EU.11 These policies mean, of course, that there is weaker
social security, health and pension protection in the UK than elsewhere - a trend that
hints at a lack of recognition of the value in workers as human beings. Nevertheless,
the Government concludes that, despite employers’ concerns, the regulation (and
taxation) of the labour market is “favourable” (from an employer’s perspective)
compared with other G7 countries.12
Against these considerations, the generation of new ideas, as much as their realisation,
is a key component in securing competitiveness. To achieve this there must be a
greater willingness on the part of employees to undertake problem solving, often in
teams. In essence, a closer mutual dependency is emerging in industrial relations,
which means that enterprises will be forced to rely increasingly on a committed,
imaginative, innovative and co-operative workforce.13  A major question concerns
what policies may be necessary to bring this about, and what legal reforms may be
necessary to underpin this new industrial relations climate.
2.2    Policies to Promote Partnership
If "partnership" is the British Government's response to the turbulent commercial
environment and the potentially de-stabilising experiences of the new flexibility,  it is
necessary to clarify what policies are subsumed within this chosen metaphor.  As we
shall see, there are certain differences of opinion as to what this project entails, so the
precise meaning of "partnership" poses certain challenges.
6It is fundamental to the Government's version that the partnership strategy does not
offer a return to job/function security and the predictability of rewards. In place of
security the partnership model seeks to motivate employees by other means. In
particular, it promises a ‘fairer’ work-place culture in return for which employers
might expect a more stable and effective workforce.  Its view also emphasises the
need for flexibility on the part of the workforce. This is, in itself, a disputed idea, open
to diverse interpretations.14 However, it almost certainly includes expectations that
employees will adapt to new commercial circumstances, that they will not resist new
working methods and technologies, and that they should be flexible both as to
working hours and locations. It may also require employees to be flexible in the
functions they perform. The Government signals that its reading of partnership
embraces many of these desiderata. In particular it acknowledges that firms will want
to organise their work in different ways15 and that such matters must be regulated by
the ebb and flux of the market.16    At European level member states are offered
guidance that they should introduce into their domestic law more ‘flexible’ types of
contract buttressed by only ‘adequate’ employment security.17  Within European
policy, just as in the UK, flexibility   places directly at risk the idea of job and function
security in employment.
All versions of partnership share the expectation of a greater commitment to quality,
customer care and innovation.18   This entails more emphasis on high trust
relationships where employers control employee outputs through target setting and
appraisal rather than through the traditional "input" controls, such as the giving of
orders.19 This is thought to offer a greater capacity to compete by unleashing more
7rapid innovation.20 A further key objective of partnership is the binding of all elements
of the skills and knowledge base within an enterprise, so as to promote quality and
innovation and ensure their rapid internal transfer and exploitation.21 Boosting the
knowledge economy is also seen as a key strategy in enhancing competitiveness
because growth can be seen in industries in which technology is advancing most
rapidly.  The Government's ‘Partnership at Work Fund’,22 having pledged £5m
investment from public funds to assist adoption of the new model, emphasises the
fundamental value of co-operation. It promotes inter alia such matters as joint
approaches to problem solving, as well as a "shared culture and shared learning".23   
This invigorated exploitation of the knowledge, commitment and creativity of the
workforce is seen as a sine qua non in the shift from an industrial to an information
society.
There is some empirical evidence to support the Government's view that partnership
offers real commercial benefits.24 Research by D Guest and R Peccei identified that
over 65% of companies which claimed to adopt a partnership approach thought that it
gave better productivity, better quality of goods and services and an enhanced ability
to retain customers.25  Over half reported that it offered, for example, better innovation
and higher overall profitability. Interestingly, in respect of these companies, the
authors concluded that the overriding objective was not maximising shareholder
value.  This is an interesting finding because, in an era of near full employment,
businesses that resist the adoption of fair practices will be at risk since the potential
for skilled staff being lost to rivals that behave otherwise must be significant.26
8However, Guest and Peccei's survey27 also revealed an important divergence of
opinion concerning the meaning of partnership. In particular, a question arises over
job security, which, as we have seen, was not seen as embraced within a partnership
agenda either by the UK Government or at European level.  The survey suggested that
organisations that saw themselves as embracing partnership also shared with their
employees a belief that partnership requires 'long term security for employees'.   If
employment security is central to ensuring the motivation and commitment to product
and service improvement then it follows that the Government's vision, and the policies
adopted to implement it, may not succeed. Primarily, there is the risk that insecure
employment and rewards will not address  the pessimism some employees express
about the one-sided reality of partnership.28  It is not perhaps likely that employees in
insecure employment will abandon adversarial attitudes and pledge the necessary
commitment to flexibility, innovation and product/service improvement from which
they are unlikely personally to benefit.   Given this possibility there is a greater onus
on the Government to explain why its model is to be preferred.   
 Guest and Peccei found that the bilateralism inherent in the partnership model means
that employees should be allowed to participate either directly or through their
representatives in a wide range of matters affecting them in the workplace. For
example, direct participation is required in decisions “about their own work” as well
as those affecting “personal employment issues”.  In other more general contexts, such
as how work is organised, the participation of workers representatives was considered
to be essential.   However, as Guest and Peccei recognise, it is unlikely that these
practices address the entire scope of necessary strategic re-alignment within the
9enterprise.  There may be further broad issues comprised within partnership: the
existence of reward systems, employability and consultation and information
exchange. Such issues inevitably also raise legal questions to which we now turn.
3.  Legal Impediments to the Promotion of "Partnership": Rewards,
Employability and Intellectual Property
3.1 Introduction.
If competitiveness in the global economy is to depend on the ability of organisations
to create both new products and services, the commitment and motivation of
employees engaged in innovation must be assured. A key issue is whether these
employees will continue to be willing to use their expertise for the benefit of the
employer rather than, for example, by setting up their own businesses in competition
with that of the employer, or by simply working for a rival.
The monochromatic agenda of the market model was to treat labour as a fixed cost-
essentially to obtain labour at the cheapest possible price - and to minimise future
increases in wage costs.  But this model is under strain.  There will increasingly be
advantages in rewarding key or innovative employees, provided that this does not
disturb widely held perceptions of fairness.  First, we shall consider, in this section,
legal controls on pay, employability and rewards for inventions.  However, the issue
of targeted rewards does not conclude the issue because the benefits of partnership
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will not be realised simply by adjusting pay systems for key staff.  It is also important
that information flows more freely within the enterprise, not only for the benefit of
employers who need to be made aware of threats and opportunities, but also to protect
employees.  We shall therefore examine in the following section how the law
governing disclosure by each of the parties requires to be reformed if it is to support
partnership more effectively than it does at present.    Thirdly, as Guest and Peccei
discovered, employees will co-operate more fully if they are involved either directly or
through their representatives in the decision making process and we shall consider
some important aspects of the legal regulation of consultation and procedural fairness.
Finally, we shall consider the broader question of how the common law could respond
more effectively to protecting the dignity of the worker.
3.2 Pay Systems
"Businesses are more likely to become entrepreneurial if their employees.....share in
the wealth they create".29
The Government is aware that new "incentive structures" will have to be designed to
encourage reward and retention, especially (although not exclusively) of intellectual
capital.  The question arises as to how far it views legal regulation as necessary to
achieve this.
Its general agenda in relation to rewards is to avoid regulation, except where it is
necessary to provide a bare minimum of safeguards against exploitation by employers.
At this basic level of protection the regulatory agenda cannot convincingly be
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portrayed as advancing partnership because it betrays a lack of political will to
safeguard the interests of many workers in achieving a "fair" wage. Intervention
occurs at the ‘top’ and at the ‘bottom’;   ‘middle’ earners’ wages remain determined
by a market model in which the employer dominates.  New Labour is determined not
to re-distribute power by restoring to trade unions the coercive economic sanctions
largely removed between 1979 and 1993, so that the market power of the employer is
equalled.  This cluster of policies sits rather oddly with the Government's rhetoric that
partnership demands fair treatment, for little is more calculated to destroy mutual trust
than the perception that pay policy disguises the double standard that workers` wages
must often be restrained for reasons of competitiveness (or an anti-inflation strategy)
whilst directors and others can fix their own pay increases at notoriously more
generous levels regardless of the performance of their companies during their
stewardship.30 A small step is comprised in the announcement 31 that shareholders will
have an annual entitlement to vote on directors' pay.  It remains to be seen whether
such a control will be effective. It does, however, hint at a realisation that double
standards in pay setting are unhelpful in encouraging the mutual goodwill essential to
the success of partnership.
For the direct benefit of the very low-paid, New Labour implemented the National
Minimum Wage. Few would argue, however, that policies intended to benefit only the
very lowest paid of workers are sufficient by themselves to achieve the necessary
motivation and co-operation of the workforce as a whole.  Moreover, the lack of
generosity in the minimum wage rates reveals how diffident Government policy is in
the face of orchestrated objections from the employer's lobby.  The entitlement to the
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minimum adult hourly rate is acquired only by those aged 22 or over despite
objections that it should be paid at least from the age of 21, or even 18.32  The present
age limit suggests a rather grudging approach by withholding from many adult
workers the protection of the adult minimum wage rate!
The common law has also been unprepared to restrict employers` powers to determine
pay policy. Employees who refuse to obey orders, and thereby exert industrial pressure
to secure an inflation pay-rise or anything else, commit a breach of contract. The
employer, who makes his or her intention to withhold pay clear, can take the benefit of
all work done during a pay dispute without payment for it unless employees work
normally. This means that they are obliged not only to perform their contractual
obligations but also to furnish any  goodwill or, at least, not to withdraw it with the
intention of causing disruption.33  There is not even an implied duty to protect
employees against the erosion of the real value of the contractual wage as a result of
inflation.34   
Where common law intervention has occurred, its effect, unsurprisingly, is not to
venture into pay policy, but to ensure that, where employers have already volunteered
a commitment, any conduct purportedly in fulfilment of that commitment is rational
and not arbitrary. For example, there is no entitlement to treat employees arbitrarily,
capriciously or inequitably in remuneration matters. Any across the board pay
increase35 can be withheld from employees only for sufficient reasons.36  A problem
here has been the lack of commitment to mechanisms to allow employees to know
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whether, in comparison with others, their remuneration has been determined for
lawful reasons.  There has been a long standing right to equal pay between women and
men, but it is only in the Employment Bill 2001 that the Government has proposed to
introduce the compulsory equal pay questionnaire.37 Bizarrely, the entitlement to
submit a questionnaire is restricted to equal pay claims based on gender
discrimination; it leaves part-time and fixed-term staff, who equally share a statutory
entitlement to equality with no comparable device.38
There is also a more general need for transparency in relation to pay and bonus
structures. The limited scope of the Kingsmill Review essentially failed to promote
the partnership agenda to which it might have made an effective contribution.39
Although it exhorted employers to maintain a link between reward and key business
objectives, it did not advocate transparency and comprehensive disclosure of pay
levels.40
The absence of a duty of disclosure in pay matters limits what little common law
protection is otherwise available.   For example, it is settled that any exercise of a
contractual discretion in relation to pay must be a genuine one and not one exercised
in bad faith. But this principle is only of benefit if the reasons for a decision are
communicated.41
The common law has, however, offered some protection for transaction security in
relation to bonus payments.  This has been a key area where subjectivity is
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problematic. Despite the general principles requiring certainty in commercial
contracts, in employment contracts the courts have established that a quantum meruit
action lies to enforce the payment of an unspecified future bonus payment linked to
the performance of the employer's business.42   However, it seems the employer's
prerogative to express the rules by which bonuses are calculated, and to alter those
rules unilaterally remains weakly regulated and problematic.43
Thus the common law project is to establish a framework for redressing some
individual wrongs in relation to pay without regulating managerial prerogative to
determine general pay policy.44  This means that, if a wider reform of wages is
embraced within the partnership project in order to ensure a greater wealth
distribution for the benefit of employees, it seems that this must be achieved within a
voluntary rather than a more strictly regulated framework.
3.3  Employability
Employability may be central to any version of partnership which does not offer job/
employment security.  Such a version maintains that employers must be at liberty to
dispose of labour, but that employees should be able move more easily between jobs.
This is a more limited version of partnership than that identified by Guest and Peccei
but it necesarily recognises the importance of employability as a replacement for
either job or employment security.
The existing common law duty to provide training exists as a limited implied term
requiring the employer to furnish any necessary training or re-training where the
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employer has introduced new working methods or techniques.45  It does not extend to
provide training to enhance more general skills, nor to equip the employee with higher
level and diverse skills, from which each might derive a benefit.
The Government has proposed, in the Employment Bill 2001 a right to take leave for
family purposes related to adoption and paternity.  This recognises the importance of
allowing time off work within the context of so-called family-friendly measures. The
emphasis upon flexibility and innovation suggests however a need for the opportunity
to acquire new skills.  This is the essence of life-long learning. However, it can be
argued that a surprising omission from the Employment Bill is the failure to promote
educational goals by allowing time off or leave for study purposes.
This omission is further highlighted by the importance attached to the trade union
learning representatives, who advise members on their training, educational and
development needs. Their role embraces an important power to encourage employees
to pursue educational opportunities not restricted to the employee’s current function.
However, these officials will necessarily have a limited effectiveness since they exist
only in workplaces in which a trade union is recognised,46 and they function in the
absence of a right to time off for study purposes.  Since the acquisition of relevant
skills may well benefit the employer, as much as it does the employability of the
employee, it is surprising that no such right has been proposed in the Bill. Thus the
Government’s willingness to permit time off for family purposes seems dissonant with
its failure to provide a valuable partnership interest in maintaining a highly skilled
workforce.   This seems regrettable given the acknowledged commitment to
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combating international competition by building high performance workplaces. 47  The
design of the Employment Bill in this respect seems incomplete.
3.4 Inventions and Copyright Works
A major objective of the partnership agenda is to ensure that employees are more fully
engaged in product innovation and improvement and more generously rewarded for
their achievements. This must be a central issue in which the law should play a
positive role, providing a framework in which the wealth created by innovation is
justly distributed.   Fair reward and job satisfaction will prevent these key workers
from lawfully terminating their contracts and either setting up in competition to the
employer or working for a rival.48  Thus the question whether the law adequately
ensures that innovative employees receive a just share of the economic benefits of
their innovation is a crucial criterion by which the partnership model will be judged.
Arrangements that are perceived as one-sided will simply encourage existing workers
to find alternative and more rewarding mechanisms for bringing their skills to the
market place.
The common law imposed wide implied obligations on employees to deliver up the
benefit of any inventions that were relevant to the business of the employer, without
reciprocal obligations on employers either to protect and market the invention or to
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share its economic benefits with the employee.49 This was so even if the employment
was not primarily for the purpose of furnishing inventions.50  Employee inventors
continue to be regarded as trustees for the employer of the benefit of any invention
that is in law the employer's.51 The common law also vested the beneficial rights to
copyright material produced in the course of employment in the employer and not the
employee.52 As in the case of inventions, the decision how to exploit the property right
was one for the employer, who was not obliged to share with the employee any
economic advantage gained from the work. These common law rules have
substantially been enacted so that work produced in the course of employment
remains the property of the employer.53
The passing into law of the Patents Act 1977 reflected concerns that the national
economic interest could be served by stimulating innovation and that this project
could be realised more effectively if inventors received a more just distribution of the
economic benefit which employers derived from their inventions. However, it is
noteworthy that the reform was not extended so as to re-distribute wealth derived from
copyright material which, when produced in the course of employment, still vests
exclusively in the employer without any reciprocal obligation requiring the employer
to share the benefits it produces. In any case, the ostensibly re-distributive scheme of
the 1977 Act has been a dismal failure. As we shall see the courts have inter alia,
construed the statutory requirement of “outstanding" benefit in such a manner that
even those who invent a product generating contracts worth tens of millions of pounds
have not been entitled to a share of that wealth. There is also a lack of consistency
about when ownership vests in the employer. It is this to which we now turn.
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3.5 Inventions: Ownership
Under ss. 39-41 of the 1977 Act inventions belong to the employer if made in the
course of the normal duties of the employee, or duties specifically assigned to him,
and the circumstances were such that an invention might reasonably be expected to
result from the carrying out of such duties.  Employees who make inventions in the
course of their duties, and who have a special obligation to further the interests of the
employer’s undertaking, such as directors, will also be trustees of any invention for
their employer.54   
The first issue is that the courts have not been consistent in their interpretation of the
meaning of normal duties.  According to one line of authority, "normal duties" is to be
read more widely than those that merely fall within the contractual job description.
Here the emphasis is upon what happens in practice.55  Although this is capable of
casting the net more broadly, so as potentially to capture more inventions for the
benefit of the employer, the pragmatic test has also benefited employees whose actual
performance is narrower than contractual and other non-binding expectations.56 This
seems appropriate because it would be important to know whether, notwithstanding
any express provisions of the contract, the employee was actually given time and
resources to enable them to innovate.  Accordingly a registrar was not required to
hold, for the benefit of the employer, an invention improving an ophthalmoscope
notwithstanding that he was employed in a department of ophthalmology in a teaching
hospital that had also had a strong research record. The registrar had been expected
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(but not contractually obliged) to engage in research but his primary duties involved
diagnosing and treating patients. The invention thus occurred outside his normal
duties.57
However, another decision gave primacy to a tenuous contractual provision rather
than the day-to-day functions of the employee.  In Re Staeng Ltd's Patents,58 the facts
concerned an employee whose dominant function was to serve as a marketing
manager. He had, however, an express responsibility to identify a need for new
products for existing customers. The contractual obligation to apply his mind to
possible new products was held to embrace a developmental role going beyond
marketing.  Thus the employee’s ‘normal duties’ were held to extend to innovation,
notwithstanding the subsidiary and very limited nature of this role. Accordingly, he
was obliged to hold for the employer's benefit, an invention he made within the broad
field of the employer's business. The effect of this decision was that an employee's
‘normal duties’ can include development even if the employee receives no facilities
for experimentation and development.
However, the problems are not confined to the question of ownership. The rules
governing the liability of the employer to pay compensation are also open to objection.
Under s.40, where the invention belongs in law to the employer, and the employer
derives an "outstanding benefit" from any patent obtained for it,59 the employee may
be awarded compensation, over and above wages paid, in accordance with the
compensation scheme in s.41.  The distributive effects of the scheme are crucial
because, if it is to encourage innovation, it must offer just rewards. Furthermore,
effective motivation demands that rewards are certain and, ideally, immediate.
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Certainty is important because inventions almost always entail deferred benefits.
Indeed, it may be years before an invention moves from the drawing board to the
market place and before the product finds sufficient popular demand to be regarded as
“outstanding". As we shall see below, the provision of significant shared rewards for
employee inventors is also very far from certain and, for that reason as well, a real
doubt arises over the value of the s.40 scheme.
The courts have focused on two related issues in order to deny, in many cases,
employees the commercial benefits of their innovations that vest, under s.39, in the
employer. The first of these is that the benefit to the employer must be “outstanding”
and the second requires this benefit to be identified by reference to the size and nature
of the employer's undertaking.  In relation to the first there is also the problem that the
benefit must be proved to be outstanding by strict evidence adduced by the employee.
As we shall see, employees are unfairly burdened in this respect as they are without
access to the necessary commercial information to substantiate their claims.
In order to be "outstanding" the benefit that the employer derives from the patent must
exceed that for which the employee has already been remunerated. It is also relevant
to examine the extent to which the invention is an essential element of the product
rather than a mere improvement of it.60 “Outstanding" has been held to be a
superlative not a comparative term and the burden on the employee making a claim
for compensation is a correspondingly onerous one.61  However, the courts have also
warned against re-defining “outstanding" which, it has been held, should be regarded
as a question of fact.62
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The burden of proof that the benefit is outstanding rests firmly on the employee.63 The
difficulties facing the employee are practical as well as evidential. The practical
difficulty is assessing the benefit arising from a patent assessed when commercial
success may derive from marketing, design and sales expertise or even shifts in
consumer preferences. The employer is entitled to recognition for the investment of
resources and effort required to develop the idea; high development costs can
undermine the employee's claim that a benefit was outstanding.64
Employees are also particularly hampered in their claims by the lack of access to
commercial information to establish the extent of benefits acquired by the employer.
In the GEC case65 the employee argued that the award of contracts for non-patented
goods had only occurred because the purchaser was aware of the patents and had an
eye on future dealings, but this could not be established in evidence. Similarly, in the
British Steel case66 the employee succeeded in showing that some benefits had been
acquired, but these could not be quantified and were thus discounted.
An almost overwhelming hurdle in many cases is that the outstanding benefit has to
be identified within the context and scale of all the employer's activities. An invention
of “outstanding” benefit is not one from which the employer derives a significant
benefit in absolute terms, but one that allows the employer to exceed its usual level of
commercial activity. For example, if the employer operates a business that regularly
deals in multi-million pound contracts, an invention that allows the employer to obtain
another multi-million pound contract will not be outstanding. ‘Outstanding’ has, in
effect, been re-defined as ‘extraordinary’.   In a case in which the employer (a large-
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scale defence contractor) won, amongst other contracts a 72 million US dollar contract
for the supply of patented equipment actually derived from the employee's invention,
the benefit was held not to be outstanding and the employee's claim for compensation
was rejected.67 This was so even though the invention was an essential element of the
product. Such an approach suggests a dichotomy between the prospects of success for
employees in smaller firms compared with those in larger ones.  In the former, a lower
level of commercial success should more easily satisfy the ‘outstanding’ benefit test.68
A similar advantage probably applies to employees in firms where inventions are not
routine. The courts do, however, allow an employee in an appropriate case to
demonstrate that the patent was of outstanding benefit to a division of the employer’s
business rather than to the enterprise as a whole.  This must be welcomed for
otherwise a significant contribution to a division of a large multinational might
otherwise never be viewed as outstanding given the turnover of the entire undertaking.
If the employee inventor surmounts each of the above hurdles the court will order
compensation to be paid in an amount determined under s.41. This section also
undermines the claim of the employee to a stake in the commercial success of the
product. It directs the court to take into account, amongst other matters, the  “input” of
the employee, such as the effort and skill he or she brought to the invention, rather
than the magnitude of the employer's gain attributable to the invention.  The statute is
thus less concerned with profit sharing than with rewarding effort by other criteria
than commercial success.
In sum the existing legal regime is inadequate to fulfil the objectives of partnership
that insists on greater internal innovation within firms. It must be asked first whether
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there remains any justification for denying employees a share of the benefits derived
from their work where copyright vests in the employer and second whether the
scheme under the Patents Act 1977 is at all capable of contributing to the partnership
agenda by precluding employee innovators in most cases from sharing in the
commercial success of the employers' patents.
4. Further Legal Impediments to Partnership: Disclosure, Consultation, Fairness
and Dignity.
4.1 Sharing Knowledge - Disclosure by Employees
 Enhanced competitiveness and a greater success in innovation require the sharing of
knowledge within the firm - a goal that the Government has supported with public
funds.69 This is intended, amongst other matters, to ensure product improvement,
cascade awareness of opportunities and pool expertise to respond to possible threats.
Here, we are concerned with the extent to which the law recognises an obligation that
binds employees to share with the employer knowledge acquired during performance
of their contract, in particular where the employee is aware that this information
would have commercial importance to the employer.70 This new information, perhaps
of a technical kind, is information in which the employer has a vital interest because it
may reveal potential threats or opportunities either of which may demand a
commercial response.
The positive contribution of the law at a general level to the disclosure of information
is weak. This is so because, unless the employee’s contractual responsibility is itself to
innovate or to advise on the innovations of others, the employee’s obligations are
24
those established under outmoded employment relations models. For example, there
are the implied obligations to possess reasonable competence within the job
description clause,71 but not beyond it,72 and to exercise a reasonable level of skill.73
Where there is a breach of contract, damages are not awarded according to fiduciary
principles so as to deprive the employee in breach of the profits gained provided they
are merely exercising their skill.74  These obligations do not impose obligations either
to co-operate or to communicate commercially valuable information to the employer,
a fortiori where the employee is employed in a capacity outside research and
development.
Employers are also unable to rely on the implied duty of faithful service. This has not
unequivocally imposed a general implied obligation on employees to disclose
innovative commercial information to their employers to keep the employer au
courant.  In this context it is difficult to state the law with clarity because the
obligations to preserve the confidentiality of certain information elide into the wider
duty of fidelity, making the true ratio of the decisions uncertain.
Much appears to depend on the facts of each case, including, amongst other matters,
the nature of the employee's function. An implied obligation to disclose new scientific
knowledge is arguably more readily established in the case of a worker engaged in
technical innovation than one who has perhaps administrative duties. However,  in the
case of the expert employee employed expressly to advise on technical matters, the
non-disclosure of information combined with its use for the employee's own
advantage is a breach of an implied duty to serve in good faith.75 It is also a breach of
confidence for a managing director, who was also an inventor and engineer, to use
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information which ought to have been revealed to his employer to his own
advantage.76  In each case the employee withheld information for his or her own
profit. Thus the breach may concern how the information is used (and thus engage the
different obligation of confidentiality rather than any obligation to disclosure
internally) rather than its simple non-disclosure. However, after Cranleigh Precision
Engineering77 there would also seem to be an obligation to disclose in certain cases.
Two questions remain unanswered after this decision: (i) To what extent, if at all, does
the contractual disclosure obligation extend beyond directors to ordinary employees?
(ii) Does it impose an obligation of disclosure on any employee regardless of the
capacity in which they are employed, since the managing director in Cranleigh
Precision Engineering  served as an inventor and engineer?
However, it can be argued that a contractual approach does not exhaust all the
possibilities. According to a partnership agenda, a failure to disclose that which might
injure the employer, whether regarded as a contractual breach or not, might be seen as
misconduct, as would a failure to divulge information that might advantage the
employer.  This means that if the common law declines to impose an obligation to
disclose as an implied term, the partnership approach might embrace non disclosure as
a possible reason to justify a dismissal within Employment Rights Act 1996, s.98 (2)
(b).
4.2  Sharing Knowledge: Disclosure by Employers
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There remains to be considered the contrary aspect of disclosure, that concerning the
provision of information to the employee. The highly circumscribed nature of this
aspect of the duty of disclosure transfers considerable risk to employees.78 It raises the
question whether the allocation of risk is satisfactory if the partnership agenda is, in
part, to encourage employees fully to co-operate with their employer's business
objectives. For example, in Reid v Rush & Tomkins Group plc79 an employee who was
injured abroad in a road traffic accident whilst on the employer's business found
himself in a precarious position. He had not been able to make a claim against the
tortfeasor's policy because, in that country, third party insurance was not compulsory.
An action for damages against his employer failed because the failure to warn the
employee of the local risks was held not to be a breach of contract.  The rationale for
this decision was the need to avoid imposing an expensive burden on employers who
would otherwise be required to forewarn their employees of the complexities of
foreign legal and social systems.     
Whilst the duty to provide a safe system of working and safe work place normally
requires safeguards to be applied in areas over which the employer exercises control,
it does not follow that the employer should be without obligations when the employee
travels abroad.  The court accepted that there were arguments in favour of employers
being required by law to provide personal accident insurance for the benefit of
employees working overseas, but stated that this could only be achieved by enactment.
This issue would seem to be one that the Government should now address.
However the decision in Reid does not establish a general rule that employers are
never liable for non-disclosure.  It might arguably be within the contractual
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contemplation of the parties that the employer should be under a duty to communicate
such information as is in its possession and not to deny disclosure without good
reason where the consequences of such a refusal would place the employee at
unreasonable risk. Such a duty could be framed within the existing duty to maintain
trust and confidence, since the denial of already acquired information without good
cause would suggest conduct capable of destroying mutual trust and confidence.80
There is also a more adventurous argument that employers should be under a duty to
provide information relating to the function the employee is required to perform
abroad. For example, there might be a duty to inform a lorry driver of the weak
insurance regulations abroad. It may also be argued a fortiori from the reasoning in
Reid that if the information is expensive and difficult to acquire it is precisely the kind
of information the employer rather than the employee should be required to
investigate. To hold otherwise is to concede that, in practice, the employee will almost
certainly be left in ignorance and thereby exposed to serious risks.  This one-sided
allocation of risk is a matter that clearly strikes at the heart of the partnership project.
4.3    Consultation and Procedural Fairness
Participation in decision-making, whether direct or by way of representation, is
identified by Guest and Peccei’  as central to partnership.   This model of partnership
demands, if not a re-distribution of power, at least enhanced influence of employees
within the decision-making process.  Enhanced communication within which the
employer is prepared to consider alternatives falls squarely within a partnership model
because of its mutual advantages.  Apart from promoting individual autonomy,
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participatory rights also place before the employer information about the employee's
perceptions of proposed change, and may provide acceptable alternatives which
impact less on their working lives.    More pragmatically, by affording the individual
some influence over the outcome through dialogue and a manifest willingness to
accommodate employee interests in so far as is practicable, the employer may make
any adverse outcomes more acceptable to employees, and thereby reduce the risk of
disruption.  Rather discouragingly, the authors’ study suggests that the level of direct
participation in British Industry is still low.81
The adoption of the Common Position on a new framework Information and
Consultation Directive82 reveals that the European institutions continue to promote
dialogue as a means of generating substantive benefits for employers as much as for
promoting a measure of autonomy and dignity in the workplace. The purposes of the
proposed Directive are stated to include inter alia the improvement of risk
anticipation and greater flexibility in work organisation, as well as ensuring that
employees are aware of the need to adapt. Most significantly, and perhaps in response
to the altered commercial environment, employees are offered a quid pro quo for the
anticipated job and function insecurity that promotes the involvement of employees in
the operation of the firm.  The new emphasis is upon employability rather than job
security.  More investment is to be made in training and skills development so that, if
redundancy occurs, the transition into alternative employment is eased. It
acknowledges that flexibility is unavoidable, but recognises the need for measures to
equip employees so that they can be adaptable. In addressing the fear, especially
amongst older workers, that "flexibility" entailing job losses consigns them to long
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term economic hardship and unemployment, the Directive seeks to remove what
might otherwise be strong resistance to the new environment.   Accordingly, the
Directive places a strong emphasis on encouraging employers to divulge information  
about possible threats and allow access to training to improve the capacity of the firm
to meet the threat and to improve employability for those workers made redundant.
The Directive extends the range of matters about which there should be an exchange
of information and consultation. Major advances concern the obligations to inform
and consult about significant threats likely to lead to changes in contractual relations,
especially where there is a threat to employment.83  Employers must also provide more
information about current and future economic prospects.  Individual participation in
decision-making is not, however, by the Directive.
A critical component of "partnership" must be the extent to which employers give
weight to, and are influenced by, the employees' responses in a consultation exercise.
In part this raises the familiar question of the moment when the exchange of
information and then consultation become obligatory. Distrust soon becomes apparent
in workforces where "consultation" is little more than notification of a decision
already taken, and where "dialogue" reveals closed minds. In English law this issue
has revealed a fundamental and unresolved dispute concerning the role of consultation
and the extent of the influence the representatives might expect.
A difficulty in English law lies in the dissonance in drafting between art. 2 of the
Collective Redundancies Directive 98/59 and the Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULR(C)A) (as amended).84     TULR(C)A 1992 obliges an
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employer to consult with representatives of those affected by the dismissals when he
or she is "proposing to dismiss",85 whereas the Directive requires consultation where
dismissals are "contemplated".  An employer may contemplate redundancy even
where a number of options are being considered; a proposal arises where there is a
specific proposal to declare redundancies even if an alternative proposal might be
available.86  Since a "proposal" to consult only emerges at a later stage in the decision
making process than when redundancies are  "contemplated" it suggests that the
employees' influence in that decision is restricted to that extent.
Consultation must take place with a view to reaching agreement,87 but any agreement
is more difficult to achieve in relation to proposals that have reached a developed
state. Consultation at the formative stage is also important because the range of
options at that point may be richer than may be the case at a later stage in the planning
process.  This must be a matter to be addressed if "partnership" requires a more full
engagement between labour and capital.
In this respect the proposed Directive may offer little comfort.  According to Art. 4 (3)
the appropriate time for the delivery of information is that which enables the
employee's representatives to "conduct an adequate study and....prepare for
consultation".  Art. 4 (4) is even more opaque since it merely requires consultation to
take place at an appropriate time and at an appropriate level of representation and
management. It is regrettable, however that the matter was not more fully elucidated
in the text of the Directive. It seems that the member states have been left with
considerable discretion to resolve the interpretative ambiguity of the appropriate times
for information delivery and consultation.  The development of consultation rights in
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English law arguably betrays concern that the partnership ambitions of the Directive
could be at risk by the adoption of a date later than the formative stage for mandatory
consultation.
Other proposed reforms to fair procedures also raise questions about the extent of the
true commitment to partnership on the part of Government. In particular some
provisions of the Employment Bill 2001 that are intended to weaken procedural
protection in dismissal cases give cause for concern. It is true that failure to observe
the proposed new minimum standards leads to an automatically unfair dismissal, but
the re-introduction of the “no difference” rule from British Labour Pump v Byrne88 is
open to the familiar objections that tribunals will be forced to hypothesise about the
range of information that an employer might have had following a procedure that did
not actually take place.  The purpose of adherence to procedural minima was precisely
to avoid this speculative undertaking. Since the widely drawn permissible reasons for
dismissal impose few controls on employers’ behaviou,r most rational decisions to
dismiss will be prima facie fair, so that the protection against unfair dismissal
arguably lies for most purposes in procedural safeguards.   A declining commitment to
procedural justice does little for the dignity of employees in the workplace.
But this does not conclude the issue, since the weakening of procedural safeguards
goes beyond restoring the “no-difference” rule. Proper investigations, opportunities to
make representations and opportunities to improve or to accept change have been
established as minimum acceptable safeguards in dismissal cases; and the burdens
they impose are not onerous ones. Schedule 2 of the Bill requires the employer to
meet the employee, but partnership would be enhanced if the requirement for
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consultation were made express. The problem with the Bill as drafted is that it omits
any mandatory content for the meeting.   Small employers, in particular, may interpret
these open-textured procedures as simply requiring an opportunity to warn rather than
to consult.
A further objection arises with the modified disciplinary procedure, the core duties of
which require the employer merely to notify the employee of the reason for the
dismissal and inform them of a right of appeal.89 It is difficult to understand why the
procedural safeguards should be overridden in cases of gross misconduct where this
modified procedure will be substituted. There are two major concerns. First, the
proposed changes pose the question whether tribunals will need to identify gross
misconduct in fact before the modified procedure applies, or whether the employer’s
honest but mistaken belief that conduct is gross misconduct suffices. Second, the
modified procedure will also place the onus on employees to endure dismissal and
then institute an appeal before the opportunity to offer mitigation arises. This is so
because the new standards remove from the dismissal decision all surrounding
circumstances that would otherwise tend to explain, mitigate or reduce the severity of
the offence. For example, an employee may actually be guilty of fighting, but may
have been provoked to fight. Under the current good practice the fact of provocation
should become known and taken into account by the employer prior to dismissal
decision. The proposal is structured so that the fact of provocation need not be
revealed until the appeal.   The partnership ideal would have revealed this information
at the earlier stage, importantly, to avoid the dismissal, thereby preserving trust and
confidence within a continuing working relationship.
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4.4  Re-Contractualisation and the Dignity of the Worker
If the essence of the partnership model is the greater emphasis upon shared goals and
the maintenance of a successful and harmonious working relationship there must
necessarily be an emphasis upon ensuring the dignity of the worker. In its absence, the
treatment of labour as a commodity can only invite resentful and perfunctory attitudes
to job performance. This is inimical to the need to work towards more innovative
products made to a higher quality in ever more efficient environments.  As we have
seen, the willingness to innovate, to accept flexibility, and to share knowledge
requires a more co-operative and committed approach. Employees are expected to go
beyond obedience to orders falling within the scope of their contracts.  Partnership is
more likely to be achieved by the transition from traditional low trust employment
models to those of higher trust. In these latter types in which employees are set targets
and are accountable for reaching them, the manner in which the target is met is, within
limits, a matter for employees exercising skilled judgment.  A greater respect for the
dignity of workers, as much as respect for their professional judgment is central to the
greater mutuality underpinning partnership. The desired aims of partnership will not
be realised without a commitment to better working conditions and practices.
The courts have recognised their role in stamping out harsh or unacceptable
employment practices. As Lord Steyn so pertinently observed in Johnson v Unisys
Ltd.,90 the need for greater protection for employees, legislated within a new scheme
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of implied terms within the contract of employment has become necessary because of
the “greater pressures on employees” caused by the “progressive de-regulation of the
labour market, the privatisation of services, and the globalisation of product and
financial markets.”  In this context Douglas Brodie's important work on the expansion
of the implied contractual duty to maintain trust and confidence91 identifies a
fundamental shift in the judicial approach to the employment relationship.92  The
project to enhance "mutual trust" has also appealed to policy makers at European level
although, at present, the emphasis is upon procedural rather than substantive
guarantees.93
English common law developments in trust and confidence have had far reaching
benefits: employers have a duty to take prompt action to dispel the causes of potential
conflict, not to act dishonestly or irrationally, to protect the dignity of the worker,
especially to avoid humiliation, and to provide a safe and comfortable working
environment.94 Discretionary contractual powers have also been regulated by decisions
that prevent their irrational use95 and ensure their use for the purposes and within the
limits intended by the parties rather than opportunistically.96  This reveals a significant
(but not unrestricted97) extension of common law employment rights which, although
arguably undertaken in pursuit of a different policy agenda, is central to realising the
partnership model.
But there remain difficulties. Notwithstanding Taylor v Secretary of State for
Scotland,98 the courts appear to remain cautious in binding employers to promises
formally delivered to employees notwithstanding that these are deliberately intended
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to motivate and to retain them. Accordingly, employers may be able to disregard these
formally volunteered promises at will.99 There is, as yet, no English common law
development that would permit the enforcement of promises contained, for example,
in formal statements of policy. Rights and expectations held out within these policies
can be withdrawn, even whilst the policy is in force unless incorporated expressly or
impliedly within the contract of employment.100
A rule which permits an employer to induce the employee to rely on a promise from
which the employer later resiles with impunity must be detrimental to the enhanced
trust which must lie at the heart of the partnership approach.  The courts have already
imported from public law into the employment relationship the concept of a legitimate
expectation.101 Perhaps within the implied term relating to trust and  confidence there
may be scope for further developments based upon proportionality. This might direct
the courts to have regard to whether the employer's commercial reason for departing
from a promise was sufficiently important to justify resiling from it, and whether that
action is rationally connected with the employer’s commercial objective.102  These
tests may go some way to achieving a compromise between the employer’s demand
for commercial freedom and the employee's interest in the security of a formal
promise in respect of which reliance had, in effect, been invited.
The need to strike a fairer compromise is also suggested by the principles governing
the unilateral modification of the contract of employment. The common law
notoriously failed to develop a model of the contract of employment that could
accommodate the need for unilateral change.  Its insistence that the employee has the
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right to insist on performance of entitlements created by the contract is commercially
unsound in a long-term contract where parameters are bound to change.  Employers
should not be forced to dismiss, and place at risk mutual trust, in order to achieve
necessary change. The courts have been forced to adjudicate on change (i.e. dismissals
for change) through SOSR.103  This, as is well known, gives little weight to
transaction security.     The employee's rights are essentially process rights: for
example, the right to be warned that dismissal will occur if a change is not accepted.104
There is no additional requirement, as there might be if greater protection for
employees was required by the partnership agenda, for the employer to act
proportionately in the manner described above, and not to withdraw a greater benefit
from the employees than the commercial circumstances of the employer necessarily
demanded.
5.  Conclusion
Commitment to the values of partnership entails a number of reforms broadly
addressing the quality of working life, the dignity of workers, mechanisms for
promoting the sharing of information, participation in decision-making and, in place
of job security, employment security achieved by enhanced employability. Most
importantly there is also the question of sharing rewards, in particular rewards for
innovation.
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Whilst the common law has revealed some creativity in its re-alignment of the balance
between capital and labour, this has most notoriously been mediated through the
expanded implied terms. There are, however, limitations to what the common law has
so far achieved. For example, the implied term requiring training is merely an
obligation to serve the immediate needs of the employer; it does not go further to
address the interests of the employee in developing marketable skills. Equally, there
has been little enthusiasm for interference in employers’ pay policies, leaving
employers largely unhindered in, for example, the criteria for the payment of
discretionary bonuses. If the courts have now accepted that employees have far more
than a financial interest in their employment it seems there is potential for further
reforms that are consistent with  recent judicial activism in the field of implied terms.
If it were more vigorously committed to reform the common law might be capable of
developing certain principles more supportive of the partnership agenda. More
sophisticated mechanisms might be evolved in a variety of contexts such as that
supporting the flow of information within the enterprise and, as we have seen, the re-
allocation of risk. Proportionality principles extended from the public law field might
also provide a more just device for mediating between the interest of employees in
maintaining contractual entitlements and the employer in varying them.
The major burden of implementing the partnership model must, however be placed
upon Government.  If it were fully committed to the early implementation of a
partnership agenda it could achieve this only by legislative means.  The Employment
Bill presented an important opportunity, but it was not fully grasped.  This invites the
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criticism that the enthusiasm for partnership is illusory beyond the field of
discrimination law, the initiative for which is often prompted by the need to comply
with directives of the EC. Transparent and just pay policies transcend the issue of
equality between sexes. Even the limited reform  that requires questionnaires in claims
brought by part time workers and those on fixed term contracts has not been
addressed.  A requirement to permit training, perhaps a right to time off, is
fundamental to enhanced economic security for employees. Its absence reveals a lack
of concern that redundancy can inflict long-term unemployment because of a lack of
skills.
The most obvious need for statutory reform is the Patents Act 1977 the provisions of
which lie uncomfortably with the stated enthusiasm for stimulating innovation.  The
present scheme is fatally undermined by the judicial interpretation of the requirement
for an outstanding benefit as much as it is by the limited mechanisms for re-
distributing the profits derived from the patent.
The ideals of partnership are far removed from the daily working experiences of many
employees notwithstanding that it has, as one of its purposes, the improvement of
living standards for all.  But this is not all.  Concern must also be expressed that the
hesitation of Government to do all that is necessary to match its rhetoric poses the
fundamental question whether the UK will achieve and maintain the necessary
competitiveness in the globalised market place. The Government’s failure to drive the
partnership agenda forward suggests a thinly disguised lack of commitment to this
model of employment relations, and the limited scope of the Employment Bill in this
respect   suggests that this is unlikely to change.
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